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Abstract
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in so-
cial choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assump-
tion that preferences have maximal elements on a ¯xed agenda. We
show that the core of a simple game is nonempty for all pro¯les of such
preferences if and only if the number of alternatives in the agenda is
less than the Nakamura number of the game. The same is true if we
replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained
by deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal
for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the core without
majority dissatisfaction depends only on the players' sets of maximal
elements and is included in the union of such sets. A result for an
extended framework gives another sense in which the core without
majority dissatisfaction behaves better than the core.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Preference aggregation theory for acyclic individual pref-
erences
Preference aggregation theory is concerned with aggregating individual pref-
erences into a (collective) social preference, which is then maximized to yield
a set of best alternatives. The theory investigates the extent to which so-
cial preferences inherit desirable properties from individual preferences. We
typically restrict (strict) individual and social preferences to those asym-
metric relations Â on a set X of alternatives that are either (i) acyclic or
(ii) transitive or (iii) negatively transitive.1
Of the properties (i), (ii), and (iii) for asymmetric preferences, negative
transitivity is the most demanding. Arrow's Theorem (1963) points out the
di±culty of aggregating preferences for more than two alternatives while
preserving asymmetry and negative transitivity.2
Acyclicity is the least demanding of the properties; it is necessary and
su±cient for the existence of a maximal element on every ¯nite subset of
alternatives. The Nakamura number plays a critical role in the study of pref-
erence aggregation rules with acyclic social preferences.3 Consider a simple
game (voting game) W, a collection of \winning" coalitions in a set N of
players. Combining the game with a set X of alternatives and a pro¯le
p = (Âpi )i2N of individual preferences, one obtains a simple game with
preferences (W; X;p), for which one can de¯ne the social preference ÂpW
(dominance relation) and the core C(W; X;p) (the set of maximal alterna-
tives with respect to ÂpW). Nakamura's theorem (1979) gives a restriction
on the number of alternatives that the set of players can deal with rationally
(Theorem 1): the core of a simple game with preferences is always (i.e., for
all pro¯les of acyclic preferences) nonempty if and only if the number of al-
ternatives is ¯nite and below a certain number, called the Nakamura number
of the simple game. The theorem thus gives a condition (Corollary 1) for
the social preferences to inherit acyclicity from individual preferences.
1De¯ne the weak preference º by x º y , y 6Â x. Â is asymmetric i® º is complete
(re°exive and total). (i) Â is acyclic if for any ¯nite set fx1; x2; : : : ; xmg µ X, whenever
x1 Â x2, . . . , xm¡1 Â xm, we have xm 6Â x1. If Â is acyclic, it is asymmetric and
irre°exive. (ii) Â is transitive if x Â y and y Â z imply x Â z. When Â is transitive, we
say º is quasi-transitive. (iii) Â is negatively transitive if x 6Â y and y 6Â z imply x 6Â z.
Â is negatively transitive i® º is transitive.
2The restriction to two alternatives disappears when there are in¯nitely many individ-
uals (Fishburn, 1970), but such a resolution relies on highly nonconstructive mathematical
objects (Mihara, 1997, 1999).
3Banks (1995), Truchon (1995), Andjiga and Mbih (2000), and Kumabe and Mihara
(2008a) are recent contributions to the literature. Earlier papers on acyclic rules can
be found in Truchon (1995) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1999). Kumabe and Mihara
(2008b) comprehensively study the restrictions that various properties for a simple game
impose on its Nakamura number.
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To deal with an empty core (or cycles in social preferences), several
authors have investigated solutions di®erent from the core. We pick two
examples for which there have been recent developments. First, Duggan
(2007) proposes a procedure in which one deletes particular instances of
preferences until the resulting subrelation is acyclic (alternatively, transi-
tive or negatively transitive), and collects the maximal elements of all such
(maximal acyclic) subrelations.4 Second, taking voters' foresight into con-
sideration, Rubinstein (1980) proposes the stability set, a superset of the
core.5 All these investigations focus on treating cyclic social preferences,
assuming that individual preferences satisfy a rationality property at least
as strong as acyclicity.
1.2 Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity
In this paper, we propose a preference aggregation theory without acyclicity.
In contrast to the authors cited in the preceding paragraph, we do not
attempt to remove cycles in (social and even individual) preferences.
We retain the usual framework (e.g., Arrow, 1963, Section II.2) in which
a set X of underlying alternatives is distinguished from an agenda (oppor-
tunity set) B µ X with which a group N of players are confronted. In
particular, ¯xing a simple game W and a set X, we focus on the aggrega-
tion methods that assigns the core C(W; B;p) or the core without majority
dissatisfaction C+(W; B;p) (introduced later)6 to each (W; B;p) satisfying
a certain assumption. The assumption, which is actually a condition con-
cerning a pair (B;p), is that every player's preference Âpi has a maximal
element in B: the maximal set maxB Âpi (the set of maximal elements of
the preference) is nonempty for each i.7 This is a rather direct assumption
at the individual level, which is to be inherited to the requirement at the
social level that there is a chosen alternative for the given pair.
The assumption is distinctive in that it involves an agenda B as well as
a pro¯le p. For this reason, it does not ¯t the following Standard Scenario
4A related procedure is to collect the maximal elements of all maximal chains (subsets
of alternatives on which the majority preference is a linear order), which yields the Banks
set (Banks, 1985; Penn, 2006); the set consists of the sophisticated voting outcomes of
some binary agenda.
5Le Breton and Salles (1990) provide a su±cient condition for the general nonemptyness
of the stability set in terms of the Nakamura number. Using more complex characteristic
numbers, Martin and Merlin (2006) propose a weaker su±cient condition and Andjiga
and Moyouwou (2006) a necessary and su±cient condition for the general nonemptyness
of the stability set.
6As the notation suggests, we de¯ne the core (without majority dissatisfaction) relative
to an agenda B.
7Acyclicity of a preference is independent of the property of having a maximal element.
There is a cyclic preference that has a maximal element on X. When X is in¯nite, there is
an acyclic preference that has no maximal element on X. Similarly, the property of having
a maximal element on B is independent of the property of having a maximal element on X.
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in social choice theory (Arrow, 1963, page 12) very well: before knowing
an agenda, the players discover and report their own preferences (on X) to
the planner; having obtained a choice rule that assigns a nonempty subset
to every agenda, the planner applies the rule to a particular agenda B.
Since the planner does not generally know whether a pair (B;p) satis¯es
the assumption until she faces the agenda B, what she obtains immediately
after learning the pro¯le p of preferences is only a partial choice rule, which
might assign an empty set to some agenda.8
An Alternative Scenario that the assumption ¯ts well is the following:
the planner ¯rst presents an agenda B to the players, who then discover and
report their own preferences (for alternatives in B at least) to the planner;
the planner then makes a choice. This is perhaps a closer description of
actual collective decisions. While failing to produce a choice rule at an
intermediate stage, the scenario has some advantages over the Standard
Scenario.
First, the Alternative Scenario can deal with context-dependent choices
based on multiple rationales (preferences belonging to the same individual)
more easily, where the context is given by an agenda (Kalai et al., 2002;
Ambrus and Rozen, 2008). The problem with the Standard Scenario is that
a player is supposed to report a single preference for the whole set X, when
she might actually have an irreducible set of multiple rationales.
Second, as Arrow (1963, page 110) writes, \ideally, one could observe
all preferences among the available alternatives, but there would be no way
to observe preferences among alternatives not feasible for society," even if
each player has a single preference. This argument justi¯es the Alternative
Scenario either directly or via Arrow's IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives), which requires that social choice from an agenda depend only
on the individual preferences restricted to the agenda. Both the core and
the core without majority dissatisfaction satisfy Arrow's IIA.9
1.3 The core without majority dissatisfaction
The core without majority dissatisfaction (De¯nition 1) is obtained by delet-
ing from an agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all individ-
ual players in a large (winning) coalition. It is (Lemma 5) a strengthening or
subset of the core, obtained by deleting from the agenda all the alternatives
that are non-maximal for a large (winning) coalition of players collectively.
8This is not to say that partial rules are uninteresting as an object of study. Com-
putability theory (e.g., Odifreddi, 1992), for example, is powerful precisely because it
includes partial functions in its scope.
9To be precise, whenever Âpi \(B£B) =Âp
0
i \(B£B) for all i, we have C(W; B;p) =
C(W; B;p0) and C+(W; B;p) = C+(W; B;p0). The assertion for C+ is a corollary of
Lemma 4. The reader should not confuse Arrow's IIA with the IIA (sometimes called
property ®) for choice rules, discussed by Kalai et al. (2002), for example.
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Consequently, it only chooses Pareto e±cient alternatives from an agenda,
unlike other solutions such as the stability set (Rubinstein, 1980, page 153).
The core without majority dissatisfaction is a simple solution concept
that treats the maximal sets maxB Âpi of the players in a better-behaved
way than the core does. (It is reasonable to pay attention to such sets, since
they are the very objects that we assume to be nonempty.) First, unlike the
core, the core without majority dissatisfaction depends only on the players'
maximal sets (Lemma 4).10 Second, each alternative in the core without
majority dissatisfaction belongs to someone's maximal set (Lemma 6). The
same is not true for the core (Examples 1 and 2).
1.4 Overview of the results
The main results of the paper are similar to Nakamura's theorem (1979), ex-
cept that they consider pro¯les for an agenda B|pro¯les of (not necessarily
acyclic) preferences that have maximal elements on the agenda.
The ¯rst main result, Theorem 2, is about the original Nakamura num-
ber for simple games W de¯ned on an algebra of coalitions. It asserts that
the following statements are equivalent: (i) the number of alternatives in the
agenda B is less than the Nakamura number º(W); (ii) the core C+(W; B;p)
without majority dissatisfaction is nonempty for all pro¯les p for the agenda;
(iii) the core C(W; B;p) is nonempty for all pro¯les p for the agenda. Re-
gardless of which choice rule is used, the Nakamura number therefore mea-
sures the extent (the size of an agenda) to which simple games will assuredly
choose some alternative from the agenda, whether individual preferences are
assumed to be acyclic or to have maximal elements.
Theorem 2 is remarkable for the following reasons: First, it demonstrates
that one can obtain a signi¯cant result without assuming acyclic preferences.
Though neglected in the literature, a preference aggregation theory without
acyclicity has potential. Second, the general nonemptyness of the core im-
plies the general nonemptyness of the strengthening of the core. The core
without majority dissatisfaction is as satisfactory as the core according to
this criterion. Third, restricting preferences to those with maximal elements
allows us to drop the awkward condition that the agenda is ¯nite. Unlike
Theorem 1, Theorem 2 gives a condition for the general nonemptyness of
the core for in¯nite, as well as ¯nite, agenda. Fourth, it ¯ts the Alternative
Scenario. It gives a condition for the planner to be assured of the existence
of a chosen alternative as soon as she presents an agenda to the players
(i.e., before she learns their preferences, supposing that they have maximal
elements). Fifth, our framework is very general. Like Nakamura (1979), we
impose no conditions such as monotonicity or properness on simple games.
10This property is sometimes called \tops-only"; it is investigated in an abstract social
choice framework by Mihara (2000), for example.
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Unlike Nakamura (1979), we consider arbitrary sets of players and arbitrary
algebras of coalitions.11
The second main result, Theorem 3, is about the kappa number (De¯-
nition 2), an extension of the Nakamura number to the even more general
framework that distinguishes the collection B0 of the sets of players for which
one can assign winning/losing status from the algebra B of (identi¯able)
coalitions. The kappa number ·(W 0) is de¯ned for a collection W 0 µ B0 of
winning sets. The result asserts that the following two statements are equiv-
alent: (i) the number of alternatives in the agenda B is less than the kappa
number ·(W 0); (ii) the core C+(W 0; B;p) without majority dissatisfaction
is nonempty for all pro¯les p for the agenda. It also asserts that the above
two statements imply, but are not implied by: (iii) the core C(W 0; B;p) is
nonempty for all pro¯les p for the agenda.
Theorem 3 gives another sense in which the core without majority dis-
satisfaction behaves better than the core. Computing the kappa number
is not an easy task in general. So, in applying the theorem, Lemma 9 is
useful; it estimates the kappa number from above and below in terms of the
Nakamura numbers.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Some facts about ordinal numbers
The notion of ordinal numbers (or ordinals) generalizes that of natural num-
bers. This section presents some facts about ordinals.12 Consult a textbook
for axiomatic set theory (e.g., Hrbacek and Jech (1984)) for more systematic
treatment.
We start by introducing the ¯rst \few" ordinals. The natural numbers
are constructed from ; as follows: 0 = ;, 1 = 0 [ f0g = f0g = f;g, 2 =
1[f1g = f0; 1g = f;; f;gg, 3 = 2[f2g = f0; 1; 2g, 4 = 3[f3g = f0; 1; 2; 3g,
etc. The ¯rst ordinal number that is not a natural number is the set ! =
f0; 1; 2; 3; : : :g of natural numbers. We can continue the process to obtain
!+1 = ![f!g = f0; 1; 2; : : : ; !g, !+2 = (!+1)+1 = (!+1)[f!+1g =
f0; 1; 2; : : : ; !; ! + 1g, etc. We then have ! ¢ 2 = ! + ! = f0; 1; 2; : : : ; !; ! +
1; ! + 2; : : :g, ! ¢ 2 + 1, . . . , ! ¢ 3, . . . , ! ¢ ! = f0; 1; 2; : : : ; !; ! + 1; : : : ; ! ¢
2; ! ¢ 2 + 1; : : : ; ! ¢ 3; : : : ; ! ¢ 4; : : :g.
For a given ordinal ®, its successor ®+1 = ®[ f®g always exists and is
11Most works in this literature consider ¯nite sets of players. Nakamura (1979) considers
arbitrary (possibly in¯nite) sets of players and the algebra of all subsets of players.
12The paper does not require much knowledge of the theory of ordinal numbers. Un-
derstanding a few notions (such as limit ordinals and cardinal numbers) and facts will
su±ce to understand details of the paper (mostly in footnotes). A deeper application to
economic theory can be found in Lipman (1991), who uses this theory to ¯nd a ¯xed point
of an \in¯nite regress" that a modeler faces.
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an ordinal. For a given ordinal ®, ®¡1 does not necessarily exist: if there is
an ordinal ¯ such that ® = ¯ + 1, then ® is a successor ordinal ; otherwise,
it is a limit ordinal. Every natural number except 0 is a successor ordinal.
Both ! and ! + ! are limit ordinals. But ! + 1, ! + 2, etc. are successor
ordinals.
De¯ne ® < ¯ if and only if ® 2 ¯. < has all the properties of a linear
order. Every set A of ordinal numbers are well-ordered by <, that is, every
nonempty subset of A has a <-least element.
Each ordinal ® has the property that
® = f¯ : ¯ is an ordinal and ¯ < ®g:
If ® is a successor ordinal, say ¯+1, then as a set, it has a greatest element,
namely ¯. If ® is a limit ordinal, then it does not have a greatest element,
and ® = supf¯ : ¯ < ®g.
A function whose domain is an ordinal ® is called a (trans¯nite) sequence
of length ®.
Two sets Y and Y 0 are equipotent if there is a bijection (one-to-one and
onto function) from Y to Y 0. An ordinal number ® is an initial ordinal if it
is not equipotent to any ¯ < ®. For example, ! is an initial ordinal, because
it is not equipotent to any natural number. ! + 1 not initial, because it is
equipotent to !. Similarly, none of countable ordinals ! + 2, ! + 3, ! + !,
! ¢ !, !!, . . . is initial.
The cardinal number of a set Y , denoted #Y , is the unique initial ordinal
equipotent to Y . In particular, if Y is countable, then #Y = !. There
are arbitrarily large cardinal numbers. In¯nite cardinal numbers form a
trans¯nite sequence of alephs @®, with ® ranging over all ordinal numbers.
We have @® + @¯ = @® ¢ @¯ = maxf@®;@¯g. Appendix A.1 gives a proof of
the following:
Lemma 1 An in¯nite cardinal number is a limit ordinal.
Without de¯ning the ordinal sum and the cardinal sum here, let us just
mention the following useful lemma (proved in Appendix A.2):
Lemma 2 #(® + ¯) = #® + #¯, where the sum on the left side is the
ordinal sum and the sum on the right is the cardinal sum.
2.2 Framework
Let N be an arbitrary nonempty set of players and B µ 2N an arbitrary
Boolean algebra of subsets of N (so B includes N and is closed under union,
intersection, and complementation). The elements of B are called coali-
tions. Intuitively, they are the observable or identi¯able or describable
subsets of players. A (B)-simple game W is a subcollection of B such that
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; =2 W and W 6= ;. The elements of W are said to be winning, and the
other elements in B are losing. A simple gameW is weak if the intersection
\W = \S2WS of the winning coalitions is nonempty.
Let X be a (¯nite or in¯nite) set of alternatives, with cardinal number
#X ¸ 2. In this paper, a (strict) preference is an asymmetric relation
Â on X: if x Â y (\x is preferred to y"), then y 6Â x. A relation Â is total
if x 6= y implies x Â y or y Â x. An asymmetric relation is a linear order
if it is transitive and total. A binary relation Â on X is acyclic if for any
¯nite set fx1; x2; : : : ; xmg µ X, whenever x1 Â x2, . . . , xm¡1 Â xm, we have
xm 6Â x1. Acyclic relations are preferences since they are asymmetric (and
irre°exive). Let A be the set of acyclic preferences on X.
A pro¯le is a list p = (Âpi )i2N of individual preferences Âpi . Intuitively,
x Âpi y means that player i prefers x to y at pro¯le p. A pro¯le p is (B)-
measurable if f i : x Âpi y g 2 B for all x, y 2 X. Denote by ANB the set of
all measurable pro¯les of acyclic preferences.
An agenda (or \budget set" or \opportunity set") B is a subset of
X. Note that a preference, when restricted to the elements in B, de¯nes
an asymmetric relation on B. Let B µ X be an agenda. An alternative
x 2 B is said to be a maximal element of B with respect to a binary
relation Â (written x 2 maxB Â though B is often dropped) if there does
not exist an alternative y 2 B such that y Â x. Let M(B) be the set of
preferences for B, i.e., asymmetric relations Â on X that has a maximal
element of B.13 Let M(B)NB be the set of pro¯les for B, i.e., measurable
pro¯les p = (Âpi )i2N 2M(B)N of preferences Âpi for B.
A (B)-simple game with (ordinal) preferences is a list (W; B;p)
of a B-simple game W µ B, a subset B of alternatives, and a pro¯le
p = (Âpi )i2N . Given the simple game with preferences, we de¯ne the
(not necessarily asymmetric) dominance relation ÂpW on X by x ÂpW y
if and only if there is a winning coalition S 2 W such that x Âpi y for all
i 2 S.14 The core C(W; B;p) of the simple game with preferences is the
set maxB ÂpW of undominated alternatives:
C(W; B;p) = fx 2 B : 6 9y 2 B such that y ÂpW xg:
An alternative x 2 B is Pareto in B if there exists no y 2 B such that
f i : y Âpi x g = N . It is easy to prove that any alternative in C(W; B;p) or
in
S
imax Âpi is Pareto in B.
A (preference) aggregation rule is a map Â:p 7!Âp from pro¯les p
of preferences to binary relations (social preferences) Âp on the set X of
13We de¯ne a preference for B on X, despite the fact that the set of maximal elements
of B with respect to Â depends only on the restricted relation Â \(B £B).
14In this de¯nition, f i : x Âpi y g need not be winning since we do not assume W is
monotonic. Andjiga and Mbih (2000) study Nakamura's theorem, adopting the notion of
dominance that requires the above coalition to be winning.
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alternatives. For example, the mapping ÂW from pro¯les p 2 ANB of acyclic
preferences to dominance relations ÂpW is an aggregation rule.
2.3 Nakamura's theorem for acyclic preferences
Nakamura (1979) gives a condition for a 2N -simple game with preferences
to have a nonempty core for any pro¯le p of acyclic preferences. To state
Nakamura's theorem, we de¯ne theNakamura number º(W) of a B-simple
gameW to be the size of the smallest collection of winning coalitions having
empty intersection15
º(W) = minf#W 0 :W 0 µ W and TW 0 = ;g
if
TW := TS2W = ; (i.e., if W is nonweak); otherwise, set º(W) = +1,
which is understood to be greater than any cardinal number. By the as-
sumption that ; =2 W and W 6= ;, we have º(W) ¸ 2. It is easy to prove
the following lemma:16
Lemma 3 If W is a nonweak B-simple game, then 2 · º(W) · minf#S :
S 2 Wg+ 1 and º(W) · #N .
The following theorem extends Nakamura's result (Nakamura, 1979) for
B = 2N :
Theorem 1 (Kumabe and Mihara (2008a)) Let W µ B be a simple
game and B µ X an agenda. Then the core C(W; B;p) is nonempty for all
measurable pro¯les p 2 ANB of acyclic preferences if and only if B is ¯nite
and #B < º(W).
Since ÂpW is acyclic if and only if the set C(W; B;p) of maximal elements
of B with respect to ÂpW is nonempty for every ¯nite subset B of X, we have:
Corollary 1 The dominance relation ÂpW is acyclic for all p 2 ANB if and
only if #B < º(W) for all ¯nite B µ X.
3 Two notions of the core
In this section, we ¯rst introduce the notion of the core without majority dis-
satisfaction, a strengthening of the core. We then compare the two notions
of the core, focusing on how they treat the maximal elements of individual
preferences.
We consider B-simple games (W; B;p) with preferences, given for each
pro¯le p (not necessarily in M(B)NB ). An alternative x 2 B is not in the
15The minimum of the following set of cardinal numbers exists since every set of ordinal
numbers has a <-least element.
16This result can be found in Nakamura (1979, Lemma 2.1 and Corollary 2.2).
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core C(W; B;p) if x is not maximal with respect to the dominance relation
ÂpW : there are y 2 B and a winning coalition S 2 W such that for all i 2 S,
yi = y and yi Âpi x. (That is, x 2 B is not in C(W; B;p) if for some y 2 B,
the set fi : y Âpi xg contains a winning coalition.) So, an alternative x (e.g.,
d in Examples 1 and 2 below) can be in the core even if there is a winning
coalition contained in the set of players i that prefer some yi to x, as long
as yi is di®erent among the players. To exclude such an x from the core, we
modify the de¯nition:
De¯nition 1 An alternative x 2 B is in the core C+(W; B;p) without
majority dissatisfaction if there is no winning coalition S 2 W such that
for all i 2 S, there exists some yi 2 B satisfying yi Âpi x. In other words,
x 2 B is in C+(W; B;p) if the set fi : x =2 maxB Âpi g = fi : y Âpi x for
some y 2 Bg of players for whom x is non-maximal (players \dissatis¯ed
with x") contains no winning coalition.
Remark 1 The word \core" usually refers to the set of maximal alter-
natives with respect to some relation. We adopt the word since the core
without majority dissatisfaction is indeed the set of maximal elements with
respect to the following extended dominance relation ÂpW . First, we extend
i's preference Âpi µ X£X to a relation Âpi µ 2X£X (where 2X is the power
set of X): Y Âpi x if and only if there is y 2 Y such that y Âpi x.17 Next,
we extend the dominance relation ÂpWµ X £X to a relation ÂpWµ 2X £X:
Y ÂpW x if and only if there is S 2 W such that for all i 2 S, Y Âpi x. Then,
x 2 C+(W; B;p) if and only if there is no Y µ B such that Y ÂpW x (if and
only if B 6ÂpW x).
The following two lemmas are immediate from the de¯nition. The ¯rst
one says that the core without majority dissatisfaction depends only on the
set of maximal elements of each player.
Lemma 4 Let p, p0 be two pro¯les satisfying maxB Âpi = maxB Âp
0
i for
all i. Then C+(W; B;p) = C+(W; B;p0).
Lemma 5 For each pro¯le p, we have C+(W; B;p) µ C(W; B;p). The
inclusion µ is strict for some pro¯le.
Each of Examples 1 and 2 below18 shows that the inclusion is sometimes
strict. Example 1 also shows that an alternative can be in the core even if
it is not maximal with respect to anyone's preference:
17We are following the consequentialist approach of extending preferences on X to ones
on its power set|the set of opportunity sets. Unless one is concerned with preferences
for °exibility (e.g., Kreps, 1979) or freedom of choice, this approach is standard.
18See Appendix A.4 for graph representations of the pro¯les in these examples.
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Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and let W consist of the coalitions having a
majority (i.e., having at least two players). Let X = fa; b; c; d; eg. De¯ne
a pro¯le by Â1= f(a; d); (e; b); (e; c)g, Â2= f(b; d); (e; a); (e; c)g, and Â3=
f(c; d); (e; a); (e; b)g. Then the sets max Âi of maximal elements of X with
respect to Âi are given by max Â1= fa; eg, max Â2= fb; eg, and max Â3=
fc; eg. But the core C is fd; eg. So, the core is neither a subset nor a superset
of
S
imax Âi= fa; b; c; eg. The core C+ without majority dissatisfaction is
feg, which is a subset of Simax Âi.
Example 2 also shows that the core, even if it is nonempty, does not
necessarily intersect the union of the maximal elements of individual prefer-
ences:
Example 2 We modify the simplest voting paradox (a cycle involving three
alternatives and three players) by adding an alternative d. Let N = f1; 2; 3g
and let W consist of the coalitions having a majority. Let X = fa; b; c; dg.
De¯ne a pro¯le by Â1= f(a; b); (b; c); (a; d)g, Â2= f(b; c); (c; a); (b; d)g, and
Â3= f(c; a); (a; b); (c; d)g. Then the core C is fdg. So it does not inter-
sect
S
imax Âi= fa; b; cg. The core C+ without majority dissatisfaction is
empty.
Unlike the core, the core without majority dissatisfaction is always in-
cluded in the union of the maximal elements of individual preferences:
Lemma 6 For each pro¯le p, we have C+(W; B;p) µ C(W; B;p)\(SimaxB Âpi
).19
Proof. By Lemma 5, it su±ces to show that C+ is a subset of
S
imaxB Âpi .
Suppose x 2 B but x =2 SimaxB Âpi . Then, x =2 maxB Âpi for any i 2 N .
This implies that fi : x =2 maxB Âpi g = N ¶ S for any winning coalition
S 2 W. (Such an S exists since W 6= ;.) By the de¯nition of C+, we have
x =2 C+.
4 Preferences with Maximal Alternatives
We consider in the rest of the paper pro¯les for a set B of alternatives, that
is, measurable pro¯les consisting of preferences that have a maximal element
of B.
4.1 The results for the core of a simple game
We now give a version of Nakamura's theorem for pro¯les for a set B of
alternatives:
19Appendix A.3 shows that the inclusion is strict for some pro¯le.
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Theorem 2 Let W µ B be a simple game and B µ X an agenda. Let
M(B)NB be the set of measurable pro¯les of preferences having a maximal
element of B. Then the following statements are equivalent:20
(i) #B < º(W);
(ii) the core C+(W; B;p) without majority dissatisfaction is nonempty for
all p 2M(B)NB ;
(iii) the core C(W; B;p) is nonempty for all p 2M(B)NB .
Proof. (i))(ii). Suppose C+(W; B;p) = ; for some pro¯le p for B. By
De¯nition 1, for each x 2 B, there is a wining coalition Sx 2 W such that
Sx µ fi : x =2 max Âpi g. We claim that
T
x2B Sx = ;. (Otherwise, there is
an i who is in Sx for all x 2 B. It follows that Âpi has no maximal element
of B.) The claim shows that º(W) · #B.
(ii))(iii). Immediate from Lemma 5.
(iii))(i). Suppose #B ¸ º(W). We construct a pro¯le p for B such
that C(W; B;p) = ;. Let º = º(W) ¸ 2.
Step 1, Case (a): º is ¯nite. We construct a pro¯le p such that the
dominance relation ÂpW has a cycle consisting of º alternatives (and the
cycle contains an alternative x0 greater than any alternative y not belonging
to the cycle).
By the de¯nition of the Nakamura number, there is a collection W 0 =
fL0; : : : ; Lº¡1g of winning coalitions such that
TW 0 = Tº¡1k=0 Lk = ;.
Choose a subset B0 = fx0; x1; : : : ; xº¡1g µ B and write xº = x0. Fix a
cycle (noting that (x; y) 2Â means x Â y)
Â= f(xk+1; xk) : k 2 f0; : : : ; º ¡ 1gg
and a relation Â0= f(x0; y) : y =2 B0g. Now, go to Step 2.
Step 1, Case (b): º is in¯nite. We construct a pro¯le p such that the
dominance relation ÂpW de¯nes an increasing trans¯nite sequence of length
º (and the sequence contains an alternative x0 greater than any alternative
y not belonging to the sequence).
Recall that if º is an ordinal, then º = f® : ® is an ordinal and ® < ºg.
By the de¯nition of the Nakamura number, there is a collection21 W 0 =
fL® : ® 2 ºg of winning coalitions L® such that
TW 0 = T®<º L® = ;.
Choose a subset B0 = fx® : ® 2 ºg µ B. Fix a relation
Â= f(x®+1; x®) : ® 2 ºg;
20 The implication (iii))(ii) is not the same as the following statement (Example 2):
for each p 2M(B)NB , if C(W; B;p) 6= ;, then C+(W; B;p) 6= ;.
21SinceW 0 is a (well-orderable) set whose cardinal number is º, there is a bijection that
maps each ® 2 º into an element L® of W 0. So we can write W 0 = fL® : ® 2 ºg.
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which de¯nes an increasing trans¯nite sequence of alternatives,22 and an-
other relation Â0= f(x0; y) : y =2 B0g.
Step 2. We de¯ne a pro¯le p = (Âpi )i2N by specifying, for each pair
(x; y) 2 X2, the set f i : x Âpi y g of players that prefer x to y. Note that Â
\ Â0= ;. (In the following, the letter ® denotes an ordinal number, including
a natural number denoted k in Case (a) above.) If (x; y) = (x®+1; x®) 2Â,
let f i : x Âpi y g = L®. If (x; y) 2Â0, let f i : x Âpi y g = N . If (x; y) =2Â
[ Â0, let f i : x Âpi y g = ;. The pro¯le p is measurable since L®, N , ; 2 B.
The pro¯le p is for B (i.e., p 2M(B)NB ), since we can show that each i's
preference Âpi has a maximal element of B. For example, if i 2 L2\L3\L5,
but i =2 Lk for k =2 f2; 3; 5g, then every alternative in B0 except x2, x3, x5
is a maximal element of Âpi . (More formally, the set of maximal elements
of Âpi is fx® 2 B0 : i =2 L®g, which is nonempty since
S
Lc® = N , where
Lc® = N n L®.)
The dominance relation ÂpW is clearly Â [ Â0, since L® is wining, N con-
tains a winning coalition, and ; is losing. It follows that the core C(W; B;p)
is empty.
The following example is an application of Theorem 2. It gives a condi-
tion for an in¯nite set of alternatives to have an element in the core, that
is, a maximal element with respect to the dominance relation ÂpW .
Example 3 Let N = [0; 1] be the unit interval on the set of real numbers
and let B consist of all subsets of N . De¯ne a simple game W by S 2
W if and only if Sc is countable. Then, it is easy to show that º(W)
is uncountable. Let X be a countable set of alternatives (e.g., the set of
rational numbers in [0; 1]). Suppose that for each i, her preference Âpi has
a maximal alternative (e.g., a utility function representing Âpi has ¯nitely
many \peaks," all corresponding to rational numbers). Then, Theorem 2
implies that C+(W; X;p) and C(W; X;p) both contain alternatives.
The pro¯les constructed in the proof of (iii))(i) of Theorem 2 consist
of individual preferences that may have more than one maximal alterna-
tive. However, we can modify the proof in such a way that each individual
preference has exactly one maximal alternative. That gives the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Let W µ B be a simple game and B µ X an agenda. Then
the three equivalent statements (i), (ii), and (iii) in Theorem 2 are equivalent
to the following statements:
(ii.a) The core C+(W; B;p) without majority dissatisfaction is nonempty for
22The sequence (x®)®2º does not end: if ® 2 º, then ® + 1 2 º. This is because º,
being a Nakamura number, is a cardinal number and any in¯nite cardinal number is a
limit ordinal by Lemma 1.
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all measurable pro¯les p of preferences having exactly one maximal element
of B,
(ii.b) The core C+(W; B;p) without majority dissatisfaction is nonempty for
all measurable pro¯les p of linear orders having a maximal element of B,
(iii.a) The core C(W; B;p) is nonempty for all measurable pro¯les p of
preferences having exactly one maximal element of B,
(iii.b) The core C(W; B;p) is nonempty for all measurable pro¯les p of
linear orders having a maximal element of B.
Proof. (ii))(ii.a))(ii.b) and (iii))(iii.a))(iii.b) are obvious. (ii.b))(iii.b)
is immediate from Lemma 5.
(iii.b))(i). Suppose #B ¸ º(W). We construct a pro¯le p satisfying
the condition such that C(W; B;p) = ;. Let º = º(W) ¸ 2. In Step 1 of
the proof of Theorem 2, replace the relation Â0 by an arbitrary asymmetric
subrelation Â0½ X £ (X n B0) that is linear on X n B0 and satis¯es x Â0 y
whenever x 2 B0 and y 2 X n B0. We replace Step 2 of the proof by the
following argument.
Case: º is ¯nite. De¯ne L¡1 = N and for all k 2 f0; : : : ; º ¡ 1g,
Dk = (L¡1 \ L0 \ ¢ ¢ ¢ \ Lk¡1) n Lk:
Then fD0; : : : ; Dº¡1g is a family of (possibly empty) pairwise disjoint coali-
tions in B such that Lk µ Dck := N nDk for all k and
Sº¡1
k=0Dk = N (i 2 N
is in the ¯rst Dk such that i =2 Lk).
De¯ne p as follows: for each k, all players i in Dk have the same linearly
ordered preference Âpi with maximal element xk, obtained by taking the
transitive closure of Â nf(xk+1; xk)g[ Â0. Obviously, p is measurable since
for each x, y 2 X, f i : x Âpi y g is a ¯nite union of Dk's. Also, ÂpW includes
Â [ Â0. (If (x; y) = (xk+1; xk) 2Â, we have f i : x Âpi y g = Dck ¶ Lk 2 W 0.
If (x; y) 2Â0, then f i : x Âpi y g = N .) It follows that C(W; X;p) = ;.
Case: º is in¯nite. Note that (B0 £ B0)\ Â0= ;. De¯ne p as follows:
If (x; y) 2Â0, then f i : x Âpi y g = N . If (x; y) =2 (B0 £ B0)[ Â0, then
f i : x Âpi y g = ;. If (x; y) = (x®; x¯) 2 B0 £ B0, x® Âpi x¯ if and only if
either23
² i 2 Lc® \ Lc¯ and ® < ¯; or
² i 2 Lc® \ L¯ and ® 6= ¯; or
23For each i, fx® : i 2 Lc®g 6= ; is i's preferred class of alternatives in B0 and fx® : i 2
L®g is her less-preferred class. Her preference Âpi is linear on B0 satisfying the following
conditions: (a) if two alternatives belong to her preferred class, then i prefers the one with
the smaller index; (b) i prefers each alternative in her preferred class to any in her less-
preferred class; (c) if two alternatives belong to her less-preferred class, then i prefers the
one with the greater index. For example, if i 2 L2 \ L3 \ L5, but i =2 L® for ® =2 f2; 3; 5g,
then i ranks the alternatives in the following order: x0, x1, x4, x6, x7, . . . , x5, x3, x2.
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² i 2 L® \ L¯ and ® > ¯.
This is equivalent to saying that 24
f i : x Âpi y g = fi : x® Âpi x¯g =
8<:
Lc® if ® < ¯;
L¯ if ® > ¯;
; if ® = ¯:
The pro¯le p is measurable since N , ;, Lc®, L¯ 2 B.
Clearly, each i's preference Âpi is a linear order on X that has a unique
maximal element of B, namely the alternative in her preferred class fx® :
i 2 Lc®g 6= ; with the smallest index.
The dominance relation ÂpW clearly includes Â [ Â0, since fi : x¯+1 Âpi
x¯g = L¯ 2 W for each ¯ 2 º, for example. It follows that C(W; X;p) =
;.
Remark 2 The argument for the ¯nite º case of the proof does not go
through for the in¯nite case, since Dk does not necessarily belong to B
when k is in¯nite. The argument for the in¯nite case causes di±culty when
applied to the ¯nite case. For example, suppose º = 4 and i 2 L0 \ L3.
Since i 2 L3 and 4 > 3, we have x4 Âpi x3 by the de¯nition of p. Since
i 2 L0 and 3 > 0, we have x3 Âpi x0. Since x0 = x4, Âpi is not asymmetric.
4.2 The results for the core of a collection of winning sets
4.2.1 Extended framework
We extend the framework by introducing a collection B0, consisting of subsets
of the set N of players. Recall that B consists of the coalitions|intuitively,
they are the observable or identi¯able sets of players. In contrast, B0 consists
of the sets for which one can assign winning/losing status|sometimes they
are the sets whose size is well-de¯ned (Example 4); other times they are the
sets that are half-identi¯able or listable (Example 5). We assume B µ B0,
which means that one can assign such a status for any coalition.
A collection W 0 of winning sets is a subcollection of B0 satisfying
; =2 W 0 and W 0 6= ;. Given W 0, the most natural simple game one can
de¯ne is the following: the B-simple game W induced by W 0 consists of
the winning coalitions (winning sets that are also coalitions), that is, W =
W 0\B. We can de¯ne the core and the core without majority dissatisfaction
as before, with W replaced by W 0. Lemma 5 and W µ W 0 imply the
following.
24x® Âpi x¯ i® either (1) ® < ¯ and i 2 (Lc® \ Lc¯) [ (Lc® \ L¯) = Lc® \ (Lc¯ [ L¯) = Lc®
or (2) ® > ¯ and i 2 (Lc® \ L¯) [ (L® \ L¯) = L¯ . Note that the ¯rst two cases can be
restated: if ® < ¯, then fi : x¯ Âpi x®g = L® and fi : x® Âpi x¯g = Lc®.
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Lemma 7 Let W 0 µ B0 and W = W 0 \ B. Then the following statements
are true:
(i) C+(W 0; B;p) µ C+(W; B;p) µ C(W; B;p).
(ii) C+(W 0; B;p) µ C(W 0; B;p) µ C(W; B;p).
Since we had better be able to identify who prefers a given alternative
to another, we leave the de¯nition of measurable pro¯les and pro¯les for an
agenda unaltered.
4.2.2 Justi¯cation for the extended framework
We have assumed B0 = B in the previous sections, but there are reasons
for distinguishing the collection B0 from the Boolean algebra B of coalitions.
We illustrate that by two examples in this section.
The following example gives some, though limited, justi¯cation for the
extended framework:
Example 4 Let N = [0; 1] be the unit interval on the set of real numbers,
B the ¾-algebra of Borel sets (i.e., B is the smallest ¾-algebra containing
all open sets in [0; 1]), B0 the ¾-algebra of Lebesgue measurable sets, and ¹
Lebesgue measure. Let W 0 µ B0 be any collection of winning sets de¯ned
in terms of the measure alone. (For example, W 0 consists of the sets S 2
B0 satisfying ¹(S) > 1=2. Alternatively, W 0 consists of the sets S 2 B0
satisfying ¹(S) ¸ 2=3.) We do have B0 ) B, though this fact is not often
exploited.25 Observe that for each S0 2 B0 there is S 2 B such that S µ S0
and ¹(S) = ¹(S0).26
The last observation in Example 4 explains why it fails to give a com-
pelling justi¯cation for the extended framework, because of the following
lemma. The lemma suggests that under a certain condition, it is not very
meaningful to introduce a collection W 0 µ B0, even when it makes sense to
extend B to B0. The proof is straightforward.
Lemma 8 Let W 0 µ B0 and W = W 0 \ B. Suppose that for each winning
set S0 2 W 0, there exists a winning coalition S 2 W satisfying S µ S0. Then
C(W; B;p) = C(W 0; B;p) and C+(W; B;p) = C+(W 0; B;p).
Now we give a more compelling justi¯cation for the framework in which
B0 and W 0 are introduced:
25For example, Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) adopt this framework to formalize the
concept that an axiom is satis¯ed for almost all pro¯les. However, their focus is measurable
pro¯les, which means they are mainly interested in certain coalitions in B. Banks et al.
(2006), when restricted to our framework, focus on simple games W µ B, rather than on
W 0 µ B0.
26Let S0 2 B0. Let E0 = S0c 2 B0. Apply the following proposition (Royden, 1988,
page 293) and let S = Ec: If E0 µ [0; 1] is any set, then there is a Borel set E 2 B such
that E0 µ E and ¹¤(E0) = ¹(E), where ¹¤ is Lebesgue outer measure.
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Example 5 Let N = f0; 1; 2; : : :g be the set of natural numbers. A natural
and faithful way to model identi¯able or half-identi¯able sets of players is
to let B be the algebra of recursive sets (coalitions) and B0 the lattice of r.e.
sets.27
The ¯rst reason for introducing B0 ¶ B in our framework is that we
cannot let B be the lattice of r.e. sets, since the lattice is not a Boolean
algebra.
The second reason is that the natural system (We)e2N for indexing r.e.
sets is easier to handle than the system ('e)e2N that can be used for indexing
recursive sets (where 'e is the eth partial recursive function and We its
domain). For example, while 'e corresponds to (i.e., is the characteristic
function of) no recursive set for some e 2 N (and there is no algorithm to
decide whether a given e corresponds to some recursive set), We corresponds
to (i.e., is) an r.e. set for any e 2 N . One can therefore write any class of r.e.
sets as fWe : e 2 Ig for some (not necessarily r.e.) set I of indices, without
worrying that some We might correspond to no r.e. set. Odifreddi (1992,
page 226) gives more reasons for preferring (We)e2N to ('e)e2N .
We now give a reason for introducing W 0 µ B0 into our framework. We
exhibit W 0, W =W 0 \ B, and p for which C+(W; X;p) 6= C+(W 0; X;p).
A set is co¯nite if it is the complement of a ¯nite set; otherwise, it is
coin¯nite. A coin¯nite r.e. set T is maximal coin¯nite28 if it has only
trivial supersets: if S is a coin¯nite r.e. set satisfying S ¶ T , then S n T is
¯nite.
Let W 00 be the collection of all maximal coin¯nite sets. Since maximal
coin¯nite sets are nonrecursive, we have W0 = W 00 \ B = ;, which is not
a simple game according to our de¯nition. We can nevertheless conclude
W0 6=W 00 and de¯ne the core, obtaining C(W0; X;p) = C+(W0; X;p) = X
for any pro¯le p. Let X = fa; b; cg and de¯ne a pro¯le p by Âpi = f(a; b)g
for all i 2 N . Then, C(W 00; X;p) = C+(W 00; X;p) = fa; cg 6= X.
Let W 01 = fS0 2 B0 : S0 ¶ T for some maximal coin¯nite Tg. Then we
can easily show that W1 = W 01 \ B consists of all co¯nite sets; therefore,
W1 6= W 01. Let X = fx¡1; x0; x1; x2; : : :g be a countable set. Let T 2 B0
be a maximal coin¯nite set. De¯ne a pro¯le p as follows: Âpi = f(xi; x¡1)g
if i 2 T ; Âpi = ; otherwise. Then, f i : x Âpi y g is fig if x = xi for i 2 T
27According to Church's thesis (Odifreddi, 1992), a set of players (natural numbers) is
recursive if there is an algorithm that, given any player, will decide whether she is in the
set. A set of players is r.e. (recursively enumerable) if there is an algorithm that lists, in
some order, the members of the set; the condition in general does not mean that there is
an algorithm to decide whether a given player belongs to it. A set A µ N is recursive if
and only if A and Ac are both r.e. Odifreddi (1992) gives detailed discussion of recursion
theory (computability theory). The papers by Mihara (1997, 1999) contain short reviews
of recursion theory.
28What we call maximal coin¯nite sets are known as maximal sets in recursion theory
(Odifreddi, 1992, page 288). Friedberg (1958) constructively proves the existence of such
sets.
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and y = x¡1; it is ; otherwise. So p is measurable and each player has
a maximal alternative. We have C(W1; X;p) = C(W 01; X;p) = X. Also,
fi : x =2 max Âpi g is T if x = x¡1; it is ; otherwise. So, C+(W1; X;p) = X
but C+(W 01; X;p) = X n fx¡1g.
4.2.3 The results for the extended framework
Before stating the main result for the extended framework, we need to extend
the notion of the Nakamura number.
Let B0 ¶ B be a collection that includes B, the Boolean algebra of coali-
tions. Let W 0 µ B0 be a collection of winning sets. A nonempty collection
Z µ B is a (B)-cover of S0 2 B0 if SZ := SS2Z S ¶ S0. If Z is a ¯nite cover,
then
SZ 2 B, since B is a Boolean algebra. So, we can assume without loss
of generality that #Z is either 1 or in¯nite. Let M(W 0) be the collection of
pairs (Y;Z) such that
(a) Y µ W 0 and
(b) Z:Y !! B is a correspondence that maps each winning set W 2 Y to
a B-cover Z(W ) of W and that satis¯es TW2Y SZ(W ) = ;.
De¯nition 2 The kappa number ·(W 0) of a collection W 0 of winning
sets relative to B is +1 (greater than any cardinal number) if M(W 0) = ;;
otherwise, it is the cardinal number given by29
·(W 0) = min
(Y;Z)2M(W 0)
maxf#Y; supf#Z(W ) :W 2 Ygg:
There is another, obvious extension º 0 (de¯ned for collections of winning
sets) of the Nakamura number º (de¯ned for simple games). Let º 0(W 0) be
de¯ned exactly as before, with W replaced by W 0.
Lemma 9 2 · º 0(W 0) · ·(W 0) · º(W) for W =W 0 \ B.
Proof. 2 · º 0(W 0) is a consequence of the assumptions ; =2 W 0 and
W 0 6= ;.
We show º 0(W 0) · ·(W 0) next. If · := ·(W 0) = +1, the result is
obvious. So, suppose otherwise. By De¯nition 2, there exists (Y;Z) 2
M(W 0) satisfying (a) and (b) in the de¯nition of M(W 0) such that
· = maxf#Y; supf#Z(W ) :W 2 Ygg ¸ #Y:
29The right-hand side is well-de¯ned, since every set of ordinals has a supremum
(Hrbacek and Jech, 1984, page 141) as well as the least element. (The same is not true for
classes that are not sets, like the class of all cardinal numbers.) To see the supremum is a
cardinal number, let sup° ®° = ®, where each ®° is a cardinal number. It su±ces to show
that ® is an initial ordinal. Suppose ¯ < ®. Then, by the de¯nition of the supremum,
¯ < ®° for some °. Since ®° is a cardinal, #¯ < ®° . But ®° · ® implies that ® is not
equipotent to ¯.
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SinceW µ SZ(W ) for allW 2 Y µ W 0, we haveTW2YW µ TW2Y SZ(W ) =
;. It follows from the de¯nition of º 0(W 0) that º 0(W 0) · #Y · ·.
We show ·(W 0) · º(W) ¯nally. Suppose º := º(W) 6= +1 as above.
Then, by the de¯nition of º, there is a collection Y µ W such that #Y =
º ¸ 2 and TW2YW = ;. For each W 2 Y, let Z(W ) = fWg µ B. We
claim that (Y;Z) 2 M(W 0). ((a) Y µ W µ W 0. (b) Z(W ) is a cover of W
since
SZ(W ) =W . Also, TW2Y SZ(W ) = TW2YW = ;.) It follows from
De¯nition 2 that ·(W 0) · maxf#Y; supf#Z(W ) :W 2 Ygg = #Y = º.
The inequalities in Lemma 9 are sometimes strict. In the following ex-
ample, we have º 0(W 0) < ·(W 0) < º(W).
Example 6 Consider N = @! :=
S
i2! @i. (@! is an example of a singular
cardinal.) Let B0 be the collection of all subsets of N . Let W 0 = fS µ
N :
S
S = @!g (it consists of the sets co¯nal in @!). For example, both
W = f@0;@1; : : :g and W 0 = f@0 + 1;@1 + 1; : : :g belong to W 0. We have
º 0(W 0) = 2, sinceW \W 0 = ;. Let B be the collection of all ¯nite or co¯nite
sets S µ N . Let W be the collection of all co¯nite sets S µ N .
We prove that W =W 0 \ B (W 0. (µ): Suppose S 2 W. Then, S 2 B.
Since Sc is ¯nite, we have
S
S = @!. (¶): Suppose S 2 W 0\B. Since S 2 B,
either S is ¯nite or co¯nite. To show it is co¯nite, suppose it is ¯nite. Then,
since S consists of ordinals less than @!,
S
S is the <-maximum of such
ordinals. So it cannot be equal to @!.
We prove that º(W) = @!. It su±ces to show that
T
®<º S® = ; for
a collection fS® 2 W : ® < ºg implies º ¸ @!. Taking the complement,
@! = N = #(
S
®<º S
c
®) · º ¢ supf#Sc® : ® < ºg (Hrbacek and Jech, 1984,
Theorem 1.3, page 188). Since the supremum is at most !, we have º ¸ @!.
Finally, we prove that ·(W 0) = !.
We ¯rst show that ·(W 0) · !. Let Y = fW;W 0g, where W , W 0 2 W 0
are the winning sets given above. Let Z(W ) = ff@ig : i 2 !g ½ B and
Z(W 0) = ff@i + 1g : i 2 !g ½ B. It is straightforward to show that
(Y;Z) 2 M(W 0). Since #Y = 2 and supf#Z(W );#Z(W 0)g = !, we have
·(W 0) · !.
We next show that ·(W 0) is not ¯nite. Suppose it is ¯nite. Then, there
exists (Y;Z) 2 M(W 0) such that Y is ¯nite and Z(W ) ½ B is ¯nite for
each W 2 Y. Since B is a Boolean algebra, this implies that SZ(W ) 2 B,
which in turn implies that
SZ(W ) is either ¯nite or co¯nite. SupposeSZ(W ) is ¯nite for some W 2 Y µ W 0. Then SZ(W ) ¶ W implies that
W 2 W 0 is ¯nite. It follows that W 2 W 0 \ B =W, a contradiction. HenceSZ(W ) is co¯nite for all W 2 Y. Being a ¯nite intersection of co¯nite sets,T
W2Y
S
Z(W ) is nonempty, contrary to assumption.
Lemma 10 · is an extension of º. That is, if W 0 µ B µ B0, then ·(W 0) =
º(W 0).
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Proof. Suppose W 0 µ B. Then, W = W 0 \ B = W 0. Lemma 9 implies
º 0(W 0) · ·(W 0) · º(W 0). Since º 0 extends º and W 0 is a simple game in
this case, we have º 0(W 0) = º(W 0), from which the conclusion follows.
We now give the main result for the extended framework.
Theorem 3 Let W 0 µ B0 be a collection of winning sets and B µ X an
agenda. Let M(B)NB be the set of measurable pro¯les of preferences having
a maximal element of B. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) #B < ·(W 0);
(ii) the core C+(W 0; B;p) without majority dissatisfaction is nonempty for
all p 2M(B)NB .
Moreover, these equivalent statements imply, but are not implied by
(iii) the core C(W 0; B;p) is nonempty for all p 2M(B)NB .
Proof.30 (i))(ii). Suppose C+(W 0; B;p) = ; for some pro¯le p 2
M(B)NB . We show that #B ¸ ·(W 0).
By the de¯nition (De¯nition 1) of C+, for each x 2 B, there is a winning
set Wx 2 W 0 such that Wx µ f i : x =2 maxB Âpi g. We claim that
T
x2Bf i :
x =2 maxB Âpi g = ;. (Otherwise, there is a player i whose preference has no
maximal element of B.)
Let Y = fWx : x 2 Bg µ W 0. We have #Y · #B. For each Wx 2 Y,
let
Z(Wx) = ff i : y Âpi x g : y 2 Bg:
We have #Z(Wx) · #B.
We claim that (Y;Z) 2M(W 0). (Details. We verify (b) of the de¯nition
of M(W 0). First, Z(Wx) µ B since p measurable implies f i : y Âpi x g 2 B.
Second, Z(Wx) is a cover of Wx since
S
Z(Wx) =
S
y2Bf i : y Âpi x g = f i :
x =2 maxB Âpi g ¶ Wx. Third,
T
Wx2Y
SZ(Wx) = Tx2Bf i : x =2 maxB Âpi
g = ; by the claim above.)
By the de¯nition (De¯nition 2) of ·, we get
·(W 0) · maxf#Y; supf#Z(Wx) : x 2 Bgg · #B:
(ii))(i). Suppose #B ¸ · := ·(W 0). We construct a pro¯le p 2
M(B)NB such that C+(W 0; B;p) = ;. By the de¯nition (De¯nition 2) of
·(¢), there exists (Y;Z) 2M(W 0) such that31
(a) Y = fL® : ® < ·0g µ W 0, where ·0 := #Y:
(b) Z maps each L® 2 Y to Z(L®) = fL¯® : ¯ < ¯(®)g µ B (where
¯(®) := #Z(L®)) satisfying L0® :=
SZ(L®) = S¯<¯(®) L¯® ¶ L® 2 W 0
and
T
L®2Y
SZ(L®) = T®<·0 L0® = ;;
(c) · = maxf·0; supf¯(®) : ® < ·0gg · #B.
30Lemmas 7 and 9 are not useful for proving Theorem 3 from Theorem 2, and vice versa.
31We can write Y and Z(L®) in the form below (footnote 21).
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Write B = fx® : ® < #Bg and let B0 = fx® : ® < ·0g.
Case: · is ¯nite. We construct a pro¯le p such that the dominance
relation ÂpW has a cycle consisting of · alternatives. Since ¯(®) · · is ¯nite
for all ® < ·0 in this case, L0® =
S
¯ L
¯
® is a ¯nite union of elements of the
Boolean algebra B. So we can assume L0® 2 B and ¯(®) = 1 without loss
of generality. By (c), we have ·0 = ·. Write x· = x0 and ¯x a relation
Â0= f(x0; y) : y =2 B0g. Let
Âpi = f(x®+1; x®) : L0® 3 ig[ Â0
for all i 2 N . The pro¯le p is the same as that in the proof of Theorem 2,
except that L® is replaced by L0® 2 B. The rest of the proof runs as before.
Case: · is in¯nite. We construct a pro¯le p such that for each alternative
x® 2 B, there is a winning set of players i who prefer another alternative
x®+¯i 2 B to x®.32 Since preferences involving alternatives outside B are
irrelevant, we construct the pro¯le in such a way that it satis¯es Âpi µ B£B
for all i.
We de¯ne p by specifying f i : x Âpi y g for each pair (x; y) = (x®0 ; x®) 2
B£B satisfying ®0 > ®. (If (x; y) does not satisfy the conditions concerning
the indices, then f i : x Âpi y g = ;.) Note that each such pair can be
uniquely written as (x; y) = (x®+¯ ; x®) for some ¯ > 0.33 Let L1® = ;
if ¯(®) = 1; otherwise, we can assume ¯(®) is in¯nite. De¯ne p by the
following, which immediately establishes that p is measurable:34
fi : x®+¯ Âpi x®g =
8>><>>:
L0® [ L1® 2 B if ® < ·0 and ¯ = 1;
L¯® 2 B if ® < ·0 and 1 < ¯ < ¯(®);
N 2 B if ·0 · ® < #B and ¯ = 1;
; 2 B otherwise:
For each x® 2 B, we have fi : x® =2 maxB Âpi g =
S
¯fi : x®+¯ Âpi
x®g, which equals
S
¯<¯(®) L
¯
® = L0® (if ® < ·0; the equality holds whether
32Though not required in our setting, we construct the pro¯le so that individual pref-
erences will be acyclic. This is achieved by the following: no player prefers an alternative
x®0 2 B with smaller index to x® (if ®0 · ®, then x®0 6Âpi x®).
33¯ is the unique ordinal isomorphic to f° : ® · ° < ®0g.
34See Appendix A.4 for a graph representation of the pro¯le. For the subsequent argu-
ment, we need to verify that x®+¯ and x® corresponding to the ¯rst two cases do exist
in B, that is, ® + ¯ < #B (and ® < #B, which is obvious). For the ¯rst and the third
cases, since ® < #B, we have ®+¯ = ®+1 < #B. This is because #B, being an in¯nite
cardinal number, is a limit ordinal by Lemma 1. For the second case, since ® < ·0 · #B,
we have #® < #B. This is because #B, being a cardinal number, is not equipotent to
® < #B. Similarly, since ¯ < ¯(®) · #B, we have #¯ < #B. If ® and ¯ are ¯nite,
the conclusion is obvious since #B is in¯nite in this case. Suppose otherwise. Then, by
Lemma 2, we have #(®+ ¯) = #®+#¯ = maxf#®;#¯g < #B = #(#B). This implies
that there is no one-to-one function from #B to ®+ ¯. Therefore, ®+ ¯ < #B.
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¯(®) is 1 or in¯nite) or N (otherwise). In either case, the set contains a
winning set L® 2 W 0. Therefore, x® =2 C+(W 0; B;p). This establishes that
C+(W 0; B;p) = ;.
To establish that p 2 M(B)NB , we need to show that each i's pref-
erence Âpi has a maximal element of B. Since
T
®<·0 L
0
® = ;, we haveS
®<·0(L
0
®)
c = N . So, for each i 2 N , there is an ® < ·0 such that i =2 L0®.
Since i =2 L¯® for any ¯ < ¯(®), we have x® 2 maxB Âpi by the de¯nition
of p.
(ii))(iii). Immediate from Lemma 7.
(iii)6)(i). Consider Example 6. We ¯rst prove that C(W 0; B;p) =
C(W; B;p) for all p 2 M(B)NB and all B µ X. By Lemma 7, it su±ces to
show that C(W; B;p) µ C(W 0; B;p). Suppose x 2 B is not in C(W 0; B;p).
Then, there is y 2 B and S 2 W 0 such that S µ f i : y Âpi x g. Since p
is measurable, f i : y Âpi x g 2 B is either ¯nite or co¯nite. If it is ¯nite,
then S is ¯nite, implying S 2 W 0 \ B =W, a contradiction. It follows that
f i : y Âpi x g is co¯nite, hence it belongs to W. So x =2 C(W; B;p).
Choose an agenda B satisfying #B = !. (i) is violated since #B = ! 6<
! = ·(W 0). On the other hand, since #B = ! < @! = º(W), Theorem 2
implies that C(W; B;p) 6= ; for all p 2M(B)NB . Then (iii) is satis¯ed since
C(W 0; B;p) = C(W; B;p).
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A Not to be Published
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We show that an in¯nite cardinal number is a limit ordinal.
Suppose ® is an in¯nite cardinal number that is not a limit ordinal.
Then, being a successor ordinal, ® = ¯ + 1 = ¯ [ f¯g for some ordinal ¯.
Clearly, ¯ < ®. Since ® is initial, there is no bijection between ® = ¯ [ f¯g
and ¯. But we can construct such a bijection f as follows: f(°) = 0 if ° = ¯;
f(°) = ° + 1 if ° 2 !; f(°) = ° if ° 2 ¯ but ° =2 !.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We show that #(® + ¯) = #® +#¯, where the sum on the left side is the
ordinal sum and the sum on the right is the cardinal sum.
Pick disjoint well-ordered sets (A;<A) and (B;<B) isomorphic to ordi-
nals ® and ¯, respectively. Then, we have #(®+ ¯) = #(A [ B) (Hrbacek
and Jech, 1984, Theorem 5.5, page 152). This is equal to #® +#¯ by the
de¯nition of the cardinal sum.
A.3 The inclusion of Lemma 6 is strict for some pro¯le
We show that there is a pro¯le p such that there is an alternative not in
C+(W; B;p) but in C(W; B;p) \ (SimaxB Âpi ).
We \replicate" su±ciently many times an example for which C+ is a
proper subset of C, and then add an \insigni¯cant" player whose maximal
alternative contains an alternative belonging to the di®erence C n C+. We
build on Example 1 here. Let N = f1; 10; 2; 20; 3; 30; 4g and let W consist
of the coalitions having a majority. Let X = fa; b; c; d; eg. De¯ne a pro¯le
by Â1=Â10= f(a; d); (e; b); (e; c)g, Â2=Â20= f(b; d); (e; a); (e; c)g, Â3=Â30=
f(c; d); (e; a); (e; b)g, and Â4= ; (or any preference such that d is a maximal).
Then, as before, the core C is fd; eg and the core C+ without majority
dissatisfaction is feg. So C+ is a proper subset of C \ (Simax Âi) = fd; eg.
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A.4 Figures
A.4.1 Example 1
a
d
1
b
2
c
3
e
2, 3 1, 3 1, 2
A.4.2 Example 2
a
b
1,3
d
1
c 1,2
2
2, 3
3
A.4.3 Pro¯le for the proof (ii))(i) of Theorem 3, when · is in¯-
nite
x(0) x(1)
L(0, 0)
L(0, 1) x(2)
L(0, 2)
L(1, 0)
L(1, 1) x(3)
L(0, 3)
L(1, 2)
L(2, 0)
L(2, 1) x(k') x(k'+1)N x(k'+2)N
For each ®; ¯ < #B, x(®) denotes x®, L(®; ¯) denotes L
¯
®, and k' denotes ·0.
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